PCP
A rejected package, not an implemented levy
The vote concerned the Federal Act of 25 September 2020 on reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. Rejection left the previous law in place; it did not introduce the proposed new instruments. The air-ticket levy belonged to the rejected project and should not be described as a charge actually established by the June 2021 vote.
The revision combined several levers. Some would make emitting activities more expensive, others return revenue to the population or fund change. Grouping everything under “tax” conceals the essential questions: who pays, who receives money and who can alter their circumstances? Separating the instruments does not remove the need to assess their combined effects on public finances and different households.
The result alone cannot establish one motive for every No vote. Concerns about costs, effectiveness and package design are different objections. The useful lesson is not to invent an average voter opposed to all climate action, but to examine how the instruments were designed.
What uniform redistribution does
An incentive levy and redistribution can work together. If payment depends on consumption but the returned amount does not depend on that person’s consumption, the incentive to reduce emissions remains. The mechanism does not simply take back with one hand what the other has given.
Distributional effects nevertheless depend on resources and use. The same payment per person may matter more on a modest income. Exposure to heating and transport expenditure also differs. Family composition, building quality and employment-related distances alter the outcome. An average describes an assumption; it does not demonstrate protection for every household.
Campaign calculations for a representative family must therefore be read as conditional scenarios. They translated particular housing and consumption assumptions into a result, rather than observing the effects of an implemented law. Rigorous debate makes assumptions visible and compares several circumstances.
Paying does not always mean deciding
Carbon pricing aims to change a choice. But an alternative and the power to select it must exist. Tenants can pay heating costs without deciding whether to replace the installation. Someone working early or late may lack a suitable public transport connection. A household may understand future savings from equipment without being able to finance its initial cost.
These are different obstacles. Redistribution changes available resources; investment creates alternatives; decision-making rules determine who can initiate change. Addressing one obstacle can leave the others intact. Repeating that a price signal is effective does not create a missing transport connection or give a tenant decision-making power.
This does not make all environmental pricing useless. Where alternatives exist, it can influence choices and encourage investment. Assessment must nevertheless distinguish reductions made possible from expenditure simply borne. The climate objective is not measured through state receipts, but through lasting emission reductions.
Investment changes the sequence
Replacing heating, renovating buildings and improving transport require time, skills and coordination. A charge can arrive before the alternative it is supposed to encourage. The question is therefore which resources must be available before or alongside increased costs.
The 2021 project also proposed a climate fund for investment. That component belongs in the assessment, without assuming every subsidy would automatically solve all access problems. Location, eligibility conditions, distribution between owners and tenants, and the capacity to deliver works would have determined its actual effects.
Funding transformation and protecting current budgets must be designed together. Otherwise a household may receive help in one area while remaining blocked in another. Collectively funded improvements should also avoid producing rent increases that absorb the expected energy savings.
Social requirements for future decisions
For the PCP, the experience of 2021 supports a transition based on practical possibilities: buildings renovated on affordable terms, public transport useful at actual working hours and accessible investment finance. Responsibility should reflect power and resources, rather than treating every form of consumption as an equally free preference.
Public scrutiny should distinguish levies, repayments, completed investments and avoided emissions, while representing varied households. It should recognise the costs of climate inaction without using them to dismiss immediate difficulties. Lasting policy needs a social majority able to see how it protects and changes everyday life.