PCP
Two ballots for one construction
The package linked a federal law to a constitutional decision on additional VAT funding for AHV. The latter required a majority of voters and cantons; the law, challenged by referendum, required a popular majority. Each could take effect only if the other passed. They were not independent programmes whose halves could operate separately.
The law received 52.7% no. The VAT decision narrowly failed among voters and also failed among cantons. This blocked the proposed timetable. Future-tense campaign documents describe what would have happened upon approval, rather than rules implemented after the ballot. Nor does “2020” date the decision to that year: it was the name of a project rejected in 2017. This study is published in 2026 and attributes no historical campaign to the PCP.
Redistributing working time and funding
The proposal would gradually raise women’s reference age from 64 to 65 while allowing more flexible retirement. A common age alone cannot measure its social effect. Income, career breaks, health and the actual ability to remain employed matter.
Another year can raise system revenue and defer expenditure. It does not automatically create a further year’s salary for someone unemployed or worn down by work. Their resources during that period and any demands on other insurance must be followed. Distribution remains an issue even if the aggregate balance improves.
Flexibility is also unequally usable. Early retirement with a reduction is harder to afford on an already low pension. A legal option becomes effective freedom only when its financial terms are bearable. Assessment needs employment paths, without presenting invented illustrations as testimony.
A conversion rate is not the whole pension
The minimum conversion rate in mandatory occupational pensions would fall from 6.8% to 6%. It converts accumulated capital into an annual pension: at identical capital, a lower rate reduces the calculated benefit. The final pension nevertheless also depends on accumulated assets, contributions and compensation measures.
Mandatory and supplementary occupational provision must be distinguished. The statutory rate cannot simply be treated as applying uniformly to every asset in every fund. The brochure explains a proposed mechanism; it cannot establish precise individual effects without further information.
For low earners and part-time workers, the way earnings enter insurance already shapes accumulation. Pension policy cannot start with the final coefficient alone. Employment duration, insured pay and contribution continuity distribute opportunities much earlier.
Who would receive the CHF70?
The compromise proposed a CHF70 monthly supplement to new AHV pensions and a higher ceiling for married couples’ pensions. It was not an identical increase for every existing pension. The boundary between current and new pensioners was therefore a material design choice.
Compensation across AHV and occupational pensions must compare the same people and periods. An AHV improvement can matter greatly to someone with little second-pillar provision. It does not automatically establish that every proposed loss elsewhere would be fully offset for everyone. Rights and timetables need comparison, rather than opposing aggregate sums.
Extra funding and savings were not an indefinite guarantee either. Official projections had a horizon and assumptions. Treating them as achieved outcomes would bypass democratic discussion of risk and burden sharing.
The ceiling on married couples’ pensions raised a further distinct issue. An individual supplement cannot be compared with the couple’s income without examining the rule limiting the combined amount. The proposal therefore connected improvements whose reach also depended on family circumstances. Displaying the individual entitlement first and the household result second would make that connection intelligible. An announced personal supplement cannot simply establish the same final gain for every insured person. This comparison also belongs in a social assessment of compensation across the package’s different components.
What rejection establishes
A no vote could concern different components. The result proves neither shared opposition to any additional funding nor agreement on one alternative model. Analysis must preserve that plurality.
The PCP’s conclusion in 2026 is that social effects must be legible: display ages, benefits, contributions and affected groups separately, then explain their connections. Pension maintenance must be testable for low-paid and interrupted careers. This permits debate over solidarity between generations and incomes without allowing inequality to disappear inside an overall accounting balance.