PCPWhat the interim report proposes
The report presented on 24 April 2026 under “Disentanglement 27” examines tasks shared between the Confederation and cantons. It describes options and further work, rather than a new allocation already in force. Necessary legislative and financial decisions remain distinct from this assessment.
The announced principle connects transferred tasks with corresponding resources. Budget neutrality is a starting point for comparing scenarios. It does not guarantee identical effects for every municipality, institution or user. Assessment must examine distribution as well as the total.
The PCP therefore calls for each option to be judged by its actual function. An organisational chart can clarify contacts without adding resources. Better coordination can improve provision without transferring an entire power. These different possibilities must remain open.
Separate decision, funding and delivery
Policy may be decided at one level and delivered at another, with several funding sources. This requires understandable rules over objectives, amounts and scrutiny. Problems arise when an authority imposes duties without answering for their cost, or pays without influence over results.
For every task, the PCP calls for a clear chain: who defines the right or service, organises provision, pays and corrects failure? The public should find a responsible contact. Authorities need to know how to handle problems beyond their own powers.
Simplification can have real value. It must retain cooperation where needs cross borders. Transport networks, education and care pathways do not necessarily stop at a funder’s boundary. Allocation must respond to that reality.
No cost transfer should disappear from the assessment
One authority’s saving can become another’s expense, a higher user payment or unpaid work. Social costs must be traced to those who bear them, beyond the federal accounts.
The PCP calls for scenarios covering the present position, proposed change and evolving needs. Transitional and lasting costs must be separated. Initial IT spending, team reorganisation and new funding rules follow different timetables.
Transferred resources should be compared with duties actually assumed. An amount based only on past spending may become inadequate as population or demand changes. Rules must enable funding review and dispute resolution before services are reduced.
Financial solidarity sustains real autonomy
Responsibility without adequate fiscal and administrative capacity limits autonomy. The PCP defends resources allowing every territory to fulfil its tasks. National fiscal equalisation is a relevant framework, but does not replace examination of each particular transfer.
General funding capacity and specific service needs differ. Population, territory and infrastructure can create particular costs. Comparisons should explain factors and criteria rather than presume poor management.
Finance should also preserve democratic discretion. Support tied entirely to detailed procedures can leave only formal autonomy. Clear objectives, suitable resources and proportionate scrutiny connect solidarity and accountability.
Preserve the capabilities that make services work
Transfers concern teams, contracts, buildings, data and practical knowledge as well as budget lines. Transition must specify what is taken over, its condition and documentation. Treating preparation as a technical detail can weaken provision.
The PCP calls for early staff involvement. Employment conditions, training and case transfer must be clarified. Cooperation should prevent periods when each authority assumes the other is responsible. Users must not have to reconstruct the organisation themselves.
Information systems should enable continuity while protecting data. Interoperability does not mean unlimited access. Use rights, responsibilities and correction must remain identifiable. Digital systems should be judged by their usefulness to service, not introduction alone.
Organise a transition that can be checked
Political decision, legal adaptation, operational transfer and verification are distinct stages. Timetables must preserve services during change. Uncertainty requires a provisional responsible authority and matching resources. Needs cannot wait for a final organisation.
The PCP supports public information explaining what changes and remains guaranteed. Reporting difficulties must be accessible. An institutional diagram is insufficient if users cannot submit a request or find their file.
Review after a defined period should permit correction. Costs, deadlines, results and unintended consequences belong in the assessment. Reorganisation must not become irreversible simply because it has begun.
Democracy capable of demanding an account
Parliaments and municipal bodies must understand their authority’s commitment. The PCP calls for comparable records and visible future obligations. Agreements among executives must not prevent scrutiny by competent elected bodies.
Evaluation should answer concrete questions: is access better? Are deadlines manageable? Do teams have resources? Have total costs and their distribution changed? Methods and limitations must accompany the answers.
The PCP’s federalism connects proximity, solidarity and public capacity. Clear responsibility should make power more accessible to the population. Success means services and rights actually secured, with knowledge of decisions, scrutiny of consequences and the ability to demand correction.
Documents and sources
The cited documents provide the facts and provisions examined. Political judgments and proposals expressed in this article are those of the PCP.